What to expect?
So the US is
headed into another World Cup. As they have in recent years, they come out of
CONCACAF having secured their place in the World Cup relatively comfortably,
but this time, something is new. This is
not the “We have to get out of the first round” Bora Mulitinovic side that was
borne of hosting the 1994 World Cup, nor is it the Sampson-Arena-Bradley “We
are what we are, let’s do the best we can” sides.
No, this time, we
went out and paid handsomely for Jurgen Klinsmann of Germany fame, with the
specific goal of being more than just “what we are.” It was a transition that
had to come at some point, and credit has to go to the Federation for being
proactive about it rather than waiting for the average American player to
improve to a level where the transition would be relatively easy. No, Sunil Gulati
went out and pushed the envelope with this decision.
Raise the Bar
It has been pretty
clear for some time that the US mens’ soccer program has been making progress,
albeit incremental progress, for years. The 2002 and 2010 editions certainly
exceeded expectations, including fantastic results against big teams such as
England, Portugal, Mexico and amazing moments against teams like South Korea
and Algeria. Even the 2006 edition had a phenomenal match against the eventual
champions, Italy, and was more of a run of poor performance rather than a lack
of talent.
But with the
population of the US, their history in sports in general – including the
Olympics, and the overall competitive nature of those crazy Yanks, there has
long been a sense that things could and should be better. Maybe a
misunderstanding of the lack of depth that the Americans have feeds into that
perception, but at the end of the day, if we can have success in random Olympic
sports, why can’t we have success in football?
But the huge
question is how? And if we think we know how, then how far do we expect them to
go, and how soon?
Klinsmann came in
for this World Cup cycle, and made it clear that he was here to chance the status
quo. A whole new slate of coaches up and down the US soccer program gave him a
free hand to have influence all along the development stream. But how soon
would that bear fruit?
On top of that, he
went aggressively for anyone who might qualify to play for the US, especially
in Germany. In a way, it made sense. It takes 6 to ten years to really influence
the development of a soccer nation, and to really make an impact, we’re
probably talking 15 to 20 (starting with kids in the 5 to ten year old range to
teach simple technique and molding them until they are 20 to 25). So that was
mathematically impossible, at least to show results for the 2014 World Cup.
Third, he began
his process, teaching his philosophy.
The results of the
first effort won’t be known for some time, and trying to read into results from
those teams at this point requires more insight into the future than I possess.
The initial results of the second effort were not good, although if you saw it
as a chance early on for him to seek out any possible diamonds in the rough,
and use what he knew (Germany football) to compare to the bottom half of the US
player pool, it probably was effective at giving him some baseline information.
The results of the
third, though, were quite apparent and mostly positive. The US, after
struggling on the road at Honduras, ended up tearing through qualifying to top
the group, and on that run, saw the team break a little out of their usual
two-defensive-midfielders, defend and counter-attack against good teams mold.
It included a friendly win at the Azteca – no small feat that, although it was
hardly best of the US v best of El Tri.
Which leads us to
preparation for the World Cup in Brazil, which included two very intriguing
story lines.
Qualifying v.
competing in the tournament proper
Every US coach
since Mulitinovic has had to focus first on qualifying out of CONCACAF, then on
preparing for the competition in the World Cup itself. Two very different types
of play. In CONCACAF, you have anywhere from one to three quality opponents –
usually Mexico and often Costa Rica, and sometimes a third from the group of
Honduras and the like. Most of the time, few of those players have the kind of
size and quality that you have in playing in the World Cup, even from the top
teams. This leads to a faster, more skilled team designed to break down the
Guatemalas and El Salvadors.
Steve Sampson
recognized it, but between the transition of MLS hindering the development of
certain players, and the whole issue with a certain team captain, he walked
into a firing squad in France. Certainly starting against Germany was a tough
row to hoe.
Arena got it right
once, and did a good job overall the second time, but in this writer’s opinion,
the veteran leadership simply wasn’t the same in 06 as it was in 02 and you got
a drop in form in the first match that cost them a lot. Oh, and a converted
midfielder (without the size and strength of Tony Sanneh) at left fullback
against one of the best European teams at the time – recipe for failure. The
nice thing, from this writer’s perspective, was the difference in response from
the ’98 failure to the ’06 flop – it was more of a “we are better than this,
and let’s get to work” rather than the ugliness that was post-98.
Bradley had the
amazing run in the Confederations Cup to bolster his side, but he still had to
make some transitions that obviously paid off against what was perceived as a very
tough opening match, clearly highlighting the point about CONCACAF v. let’s
say, England.
Klinsmann, on the
other hand, has kept a lot of his team together, even to the extent of
including a converted midfielder at left fullback. But a lot of his team,
especially the young and quite inexperienced defense, is what he used to get
through qualifying – one that was less reliant on defend and counter and
oftentimes was more attacking in philosophy.
With one key
exception…
Donovan
This has been
discussed to death, and for good reason. The most decorated and statistically
relevant player in US history, Landon Donovan, was left of the plane for Brazil
even though he obviously still is a competitive player and likely one of the
best 15 players the US has.
After reading and
discussing, this writer is of the opinion that it came down to two things. First,
mentality. Donovan is talented, no doubt, but he isn’t the hard, aggressive,
competitive player that, say, Michael Bradley or Clint Dempsey is. And that
apparently is a huge part of the kind of camp that Klinsmann wants. Personally,
it is hard for me to balance that with what Donovan did to win the Algeria game
– if that doesn’t personify the “never say die” mentality, I don’t know what
does – but again, I am trying to understand and explain what I can about
Klinsmann, not justify it.
Second, I think he
wants to make sure that it is clear that his captain, Dempsey, has no ghost in
the room in terms of “the most decorated player in US history” who might be
pacing himself in terms of level of play because he is on the wrong side of 30.
But bottom line,
he clearly is saying that he needs the players he feels are able to best help
this team right now. It is a pretty bold statement, and may not be the best
bet. Frankly, I can see a need for a player like a rested Donovan in the third
game against Germany (talk about a chance at redemption). But it is the
decision Klinsmann has made.
Conclusion
So with all of
that being said by way of landscape – and that is a lot of ground to cover – we
come to the question we started with, “how are we to judge Klinsmann in this
World Cup?” Without going into much detail, let me say that the “if we don’t
get out of the group, it is a failure” is out the window. Simply look at the
opponents to know that. The US has never had a tougher task to get out of the
group. So what is it? For me, this side should be good enough to win a “must
win” game against Ghana. So that is step one.
Next, make the
most of it. Play well against Portugal and Germany, and if they make the plays
to win it (a free from Ronaldo or some-such), so be it. But make them earn it.
Leave everything on the field, and ideally, by trying to play – not by trying
to bunker and steal on the counter. Especially against Portugal. If we beat
Ghana, tie Portugal and need a tie to advance, bunker until the cows come home
against Germany. But that is situational. Ultimately, play well, play like you
belong, and if you lose, lose because the other team was better, not because
you made a stupid mistake. Lose because they have the best player in the world,
not because we brought someone less experienced than Landon Donovan.
Ultimately, if you
don’t advance, have it be because the opponents were better, not because you
brought youth rather than Landon Donovan.
No comments:
Post a Comment